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Abstract
Anomaly detection becomes increasingly important
for the dependability and serviceability of IT services.
As log lines record events during the execution of IT
services, they are a primary source for diagnostics.
Thereby, unsupervised methods provide a significant
benefit since not all anomalies can be known at
training time. Existing unsupervised methods need
anomaly examples to obtain a suitable decision
boundary required for the anomaly detection task. This
requirement poses practical limitations. Therefore, we
develop A2Log, which is an unsupervised anomaly
detection method consisting of two steps: Anomaly
scoring and anomaly decision. First, we utilize a
self-attention neural network to perform the scoring
for each log message. Second, we set the decision
boundary based on data augmentation of the available
normal training data. The method is evaluated on
three publicly available datasets and one industry
dataset. We show that our approach outperforms
existing methods. Furthermore, we utilize available
anomaly examples to set optimal decision boundaries to
acquire strong baselines. We show that our approach,
which determines decision boundaries without utilizing
anomaly examples, can reach scores of the strong
baselines.
1. Introduction
IT systems are rapidly evolving to meet the growing
demand for new services and applications in various
economic fields. Many companies outsource their
services to the cloud [1]. This outsourcing entails
growing data centers, increasingly large networks,
and interconnected devices to provide the required
IT services. Despite accelerating innovations and
business opportunities, this trend increases complexity
and thus, aggravates the operation and maintenance
of these services and systems [2]. Operators of the
services require assistance in maintaining control of
this complexity to ensure dependability, stability, and
serviceability. The field of artificial intelligence for IT
operations (AIOps) is intended to support service and
system operators to meet these challenges. Thereby,
anomaly detection is a vital part, which is applied to
monitoring data such as metrics, logs, or traces.
Log data is a primary source for troubleshooting
since they record events during the execution of service
applications. These logging events evolve due to
software updates. Therefore unsupervised methods
are valuable due to their sense of new and unknown
anomalies [3, 4]. The second benefit of unsupervised
methods is that they do not require labeled data, which
is hard to obtain and cost-intensive [5]. Due to
the complexity of IT services, the log data volume
is growing to the extent that it cannot be manually
analyzed. Therefore, recent research uses deep learning
to analyze log data and perform anomaly detection
[6, 7, 8]. These studies mostly assume the existence
of a sufficient amount of labeled validation data for
parameter tuning. However, in production settings,
where services evolve, such data is hard to obtain,
volatile, and requires manual evaluation by experts.
In particular, when it comes to deriving an anomaly
decision, these methods lack the capability to obtain
a decision in an unsupervised manner. The anomaly
decision in all mentioned methods is based on a decision
boundary that decides on the respective binary class.
Commonly employed methods need to be aware of the
anomalies in the validation data to set this decision
boundary optimally. This relatively strong requirement
poses limitations.
In this paper, we address these problems via a
two-fold solution called A2Log. First, we create a
neural network based on the self-attention mechanism to
perform an anomaly scoring. Second, we perform data
augmentation to generate deviations on the respective
training data [9, 10], to analyze the model response and
calculate the final decision boundary. In both steps, only
normal training data is used, thus we call our approach
unsupervised.





The contributions of this work contain the following:
• An unsupervised anomaly detection method for
log data, based on an encoder transformer
architecture.
• An unsupervised decision boundary calculation
for the anomaly decision, based on a novel data
augmentation method for log data.
• An evaluation of the method, based on three
different real-world and publicly available
datasets, which are BGL, thunderbird, and spirit1.
• An evaluation of the method, based on an industry
dataset from an IT service provider.
This paper is structured as follows. First, related
work is presented in section 2. A general framework
for anomaly detection on log data as well as a problem
description for the final anomaly decision are presented
in section 3. Preliminaries and implementation details of
our method are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5
presents our evaluation and section 6 is concluding the
work.
2. Related Work
Detecting abnormal events in large-scale systems,
indicated by log files, is crucial for creating dependable
services. Therefore, log analysis becomes increasingly
important for industry and academia [11] and a wide
range of different anomaly detection techniques have
been developed and discussed in detailed surveys [4,
12]. They utilize different forms of log templates
and log embeddings to convert the logs to a
machine-readable format. Commonly used anomaly
detection methods are support vector machines [13] and
principal component analysis [14]. In addition, there
are rule-based [15], tree-based [16], statistical [17], as
well as methods based on clustering [18, 19, 20, 21].
Whereas recent anomaly detection methods are mainly
designed with neural networks [22, 23, 24] and based on
encoder architectures [25, 26]. Equally, recent methods
utilizing the attention mechanism that is often used in
encoder architectures [27].
We classify anomaly detection methods in two
different types: supervised and unsupervised [28].
Supervised methods are usually more accurate, though
they train the anomalies of the specific dataset as well
[22, 29]. However, not all anomalies can be known in
advance. Hence, in industrial applications, unsupervised
methods are more practical as anomaly labels are mostly
unavailable [30, 5].
1https://www.usenix.org/cfdr-data
Consequently, we focus on unsupervised methods
in this paper. Several unsupervised learning methods,
based on neural networks, have been proposed, of which
we present a selection in the following.
Du et al. [7] proposed DeepLog, a Long short-term
memory (LSTM) network architecture that is capable
of identifying abnormal sequences of log messages.
For this, log templates are generated and sequences
of templates are formed as model inputs. The model
provides a ranked output with probabilities for the next
template in a given sequence. The anomaly detection
is then based on whether the next template has a high
probability or not.
LogAnomaly [30] is similar to DeepLog and
predicts the next log message in a sequence of
log messages. Instead of utilizing sequences of
log templates, LogAnomaly utilizes sequences of log
embeddings to improve prediction effectiveness.
Yang et al. [31] combining the attention mechanism
with a gated recurrent network architecture to perform
anomaly detection on log data. Thereby the log
messages are transformed into log templates, to then
predict if a sequence of log templates is normal or
abnormal. Furthermore, the labels of the training date
are estimated to incorporate knowledge on historical
anomalies into the model.
Another approach is Logsy as proposed by
Nedelkoski et al. [8]. This approach also incorporates
the attention mechanism with an encoder architecture,
where log embeddings are calculated. The embeddings
of normal log messages are condensed into a
centroid using a hyperspherical loss function, whereby
embeddings of abnormal log messages are pushed away.
The anomaly detection task is then based on the distance
to the centroid
Guo et al. [6] introduce LogBERT. It utilizes the
transformer network from BERT [32], which consists
of an encoder and a decoder, including the attention
mechanism. Like DeepLog, it tries to predict a
targeted log template of a sequence. Therefore, they
utilize temporal-related log embeddings around the
prediction target as inputs. To predict the targeted log
template, it utilizes Cross-Entropy-Loss, extended by a
hyperspherical loss function, to ensure compactness of
the embeddings.
However, all methods presented above use a
manually set decision boundary for anomaly detection.
However, optimization requires knowledge about the
anomalies, which limits these methods.
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3. Anomaly Detection on Log Data
In this section, we describe the general framework
for anomaly detection on log data. Afterwards,
we describe the problem of automatically finding an
accurate decision boundary for the anomaly detection
task.
3.1. General Framework
Anomalies are patterns in data that do not conform
to a defined notion of normal behavior [4]. Anything
that deviates from normal behavior can be considered
abnormal behavior. Steinwall et al. [33] state that
this can be considered as a binary classification task.
Consequently, anomaly detection on log data is defined
as the problem of assigning a binary label to each
log message. There are two principal approaches to
anomaly detection: Supervised and unsupervised. In
terms of anomaly detection on log data, supervised
means that both classes, normal and abnormal, are used
during the training phase. Unsupervised means that
the model is trained on normal log messages only. As
not all possible anomalies in log data can be known
and used for training [34], unsupervised approaches are
well suited for log data scenarios, and thus are of high
interest for industry and academia [11, 3]. Therefore, the
challenge is to develop a good understanding of normal
log messages, e.g. by internalizing their usual structure,
such that any significant deviations can be treated as
log messages representing abnormal behavior. Thus, a









Figure 1. Structure of an unsupervised anomaly
detection method for log data content.
Figure 1 illustrates the process of the anomaly
detection task. First, the log message must be
transformed into a format that is suitable for machine
learning algorithms. Since anomaly detection models
are often designed as neural networks [35, 7, 8] which
we also utilize in this work, we consider the case
of employing a neural network architecture. The
output of a neural network is commonly transformed
such that it can be interpreted as a probability or a
probability distribution over one or multiple output
neurons, from which further decisions can be inferred.
Therefore, an anomaly detection method requires a final
decision on interpreting the neural network’s output.
From this, we conclude that an unsupervised anomaly
detection method, which includes a neural network,
consists of two parts: The Anomaly Scoring and the
Anomaly Decision. The neural network learns the
normal behavior in the first part and calculates an
anomaly score for each log message. Therefore, the
Anomaly Scoring must transform each log message
into a real-valued output. The second part is the
final anomaly detection decision, based on the anomaly
scoring, which transforms the scores into a binary
classification. Formally, the anomaly detection model
Φ for log data L is described by two functions, s and
a, where s : L → R is the Anomaly Scoring function,
represented by a neural network and a : R → {0, 1} is
the Anomaly Decision. Therefore, Φ = a(s(x)), where
x is the preprocessed log data input.
3.2. Problem Description
Two main challenges naturally arise when designing
an unsupervised anomaly detection method, in our case
on log data. On the one hand, the respective model is
purely trained on normal log messages, which makes it
difficult to identify abnormal log messages as such, as
the computed anomaly scores cannot be interpreted, and
thus scores of real abnormal log messages can have an
arbitrary form. On the other hand, the decision boundary
for separation of both classes is also configured based on
normal log messages only. A solution to this problem
needs to take these challenges into consideration.
Training data Normal test data Abnormal test data





Figure 2. Illustration of the various possibilities for
manually setting a decision boundary.
Figure 2 demonstrates the difficulty of setting a
precise decision boundary by only utilizing normal data
points from the training. The blue points represent
normal data points, which are part of the training
data. The green and red points represent normal and
abnormal data points during the test phase. It can be
observed that the green points are on average closer to
the normal trained data points, yet considering them for
configuration of the decision boundary would lead to a
suboptimal separation. If the decision boundary is too
small, too many log messages will be classified as false
positive by the method. If the decision boundary is too
Page 1855
large, too many log messages will be classified as false
negatives. Both scenarios result in weaker precision,
recall, and F1 scores. This example demonstrates that
both components, the Anomaly Scoring and the Anomaly
Decision, have to be precise.
Due to the various factors influencing the training of
a neural network, each trained anomaly scoring model
will most likely produce different anomaly scores for
the same data, and therefore the final decision boundary
must be set individually for each model. Moreover, as
the nature and relation of future normal and abnormal
log messages cannot be known in advance, it is
required that the decision boundary can cope with these
uncertainties and still provide good decisions solely
based on seen normal log messages.
4. Method
This section describes in detail our approach
A2Log for unsupervised anomaly detection on log data,
including our proposed solutions for anomaly scoring
and anomaly decision. Prior to that, we briefly introduce
the necessary preliminaries.
4.1. Preliminaries
Logging is commonly employed in order to
investigate faulty behavior of systems and services and
to increase dependability, which results in information
being written to a log file. The log file documents
the executions of the software and is created by log
instructions (e.g. printf() or log.info()). Each
log instruction results in a single log message, such
that the complete log is a sequence of messages L =
(li : i = 1, 2, 3, . . .). There is a commonly
used separation in meta-information and content. The
meta-information can contain various information, for
example, timestamps or severity levels. The content is
free text and consists of a static and a variable part. The
static part is called log template. To access the content
of a log message li, we write ci.
In order to transform the content into a
representation that an algorithm can process, methods
from the research field of Natural Language Processing
(NLP) are applied. Two main concepts are tokenization
and embeddings.
Tokenization. This process splits written text into
segments (e.g., words, word stems, or characters). The
smallest indecomposable unit within a log content ci
is a token. Consequently, each log content ci can be
interpreted as a sequence of tokens ti
ti = (wj : wj ∈ V, j = 1, 2, 3, . . .), (1)
where w is a token, V is a set of all known tokens
commonly referred to as the vocabulary, j is the
positional index of a token within the token sequence.
To access a specific token at position j, we write tji .
Thus, tokenization translates a text into a sequence of
tokens using a vocabulary. The amount of tokens ni for
each log message and the structure of each token can
vary, depending on the concrete tokenization method.
Embeddings. As the tokens themselves are words
of the vocabulary V , they cannot be passed into a neural
network directly. Furthermore, tokens do not provide
any information about their similarity or difference to
each other, hence, so called embeddings are used to
compute a representation of the tokens such that a
machine learning model can process it. Embeddings
are real-valued vector representations ~v ∈ Rd of either
token sequences or a single token; a transformation
function g : V → Rd transforms a token wj into an
embedding ~vj . Thereby the same tokens receive the
same embeddings. The sequence of embeddings ~ei, that
is describing the corresponding sequence of tokens ti, is
defined as follows:
~ei = (g(wj) : wj ∈ ti, j = 1, 2, . . . , |ti|), (2)
To access the j-th embedding in a sequence of
embeddings, we write ~ei(j). Embeddings are trainable
units adapted during the training process to represent the
meaning of the underlying token or sequence of tokens.
4.2. A2Log
As a solution for an unsupervised anomaly detection
method, we propose A2Log. A2Log consists of two
parts: the Anomaly Scoring and the Anomaly Decision.
To provide a general anomaly detection method, we
only utilize the content of log messages, which is a
commonality of different log types.
The schematic flow in Figure 3 of A2Log is as
follows.
Log Line T T T









Figure 3. Five steps to classify a log message
utilizing a transformer architecture.
During the first step, the content ci of every
log message li is extracted and in the process
tokenized to a sequence of tokens ti using the symbols
.,:/ and whitespaces as separators. Subsequently,
we further clean the resulting sequence of tokens
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by replacing certain tokens with placeholders that
adequately represent the original token without losing
relevant information. We introduce placeholder tokens
for hexadecimal values [HEX] or any number greater
or equal 10 [NUM]. Finally, we prefix the sequence
of transformed tokens with a special placeholder token
[CLS] which will be beneficial later on. An exemplary
log message
time.c: Detected 3591.142 MHz.
is thus transformed into a sequence of tokens ti:
[[CLS], time, c, Detected, [NUM],
[NUM], MHz].
The token sequence ti serves as the input for our
Anomaly Scoring model. Therefore, we utilize the
encoder of the transformer architecture [32] with
self-attention [27]. We have chosen this model
architecture since it has already performed well in the
domain of natural language processing. The encoder of
the transformer architecture is applied to map sequences
of tokens onto one d-dimensional vector (embedding),












Figure 4. Transformer encoder architecture.
Figure 4 depicts the aforementioned network
architecture. During the embedding step, for each token
wj in the token sequence ti, an embedding ~ei(j) is
obtained using the transformation function g. These
embeddings are equal for the same tokens and modified
during the training process. Since these sequences can
vary in length, we truncate them to a fixed size u and
fill up smaller sequences with padding tokens [PAD].
Hence, the employed architecture does not consider the
order of the tokens, the input sequence is enriched with
positional encoding [27, 36]. Based on this, the attention
mechanism can take the order of the tokens into account.
The model then computes an output embedding
for each truncated input embedding sequence,
which summarizes the log message by utilizing
the embeddings of all tokens. This output embedding
is encoded in the embedding of the [CLS] token and
also modified during training, by minimizing the loss.
During the training process, the model is supposed to
learn the meanings of the log messages, thereby getting
an intuition of normal log messages. We denote the
output of the model as ~zi = s(ti) and use it throughout
the remaining steps. Thereby the anomaly score is
calculated by the length of the output vector ‖~zi‖.
These values must reflect the anomaly probability for
each sequence. We set the scoring target for normal data
to 0 as the absolute normal state, so that the likeliness
of an anomaly in the log message is proportional to
increasing positive values. The following objective
function is utilized to ensure compact anomaly scores






− yi · log(1− exp(−‖~zi‖2))
(3)
Thereby, yi is the label for each input ti, which
implies that there must be two classes to train the
neural network to avoid the implosion of the model.
If there is only one class, the objective function will
force the model to produce the same result independent
of the input. Therefore, we define a stabilization class
S as the second class which encompasses normal log
messages but with different origins. This second class is
constructed by utilizing normal log messages from other
services, where we randomly sample an equal amount of
log messages from each service. This gives the model an
intuition of variety in log messages and, therefore, the
model should be able to assign different anomaly scores
to real anomalies based on log message characteristics.
Eventually, the Anomaly Decision function assigns each
log message an explicit label ∈ {0, 1} with
a(‖~zi‖) =
{
1, ‖~zi‖ > ε,
0, ‖~zi‖ ≤ ε
(4)
where ε is a decision boundary that is used to obtain
binary labels from anomaly scores.
As we do not know how the Anomaly Score will
turn out for new normal log messages appearing in the
future, we require a method that simulates deviations to
the already trained log messages to understand how the
model will react, and determines the decision boundary
ε. We simulate deviations to the normal training data by
applying data augmentation.
Figure 5 depicts our method for data augmentation
on log data. The data augmentation is applied to the
log messages of the original training dataset ltrain only,
without the stabilization class S. First, the log messages
are tokenized, followed by replacing α ∈ N tokens
at random positions in each token sequence ti with a
masking token [M], described in Equation 5.
t′i = (wj : wj ∈ V ∨wj = [M], j = 1, 2, . . . , |ti|) (5)
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Figure 5. Data augmentation with α = 2 replaced
tokens.
Then the trained model for the Anomaly Scoring s
calculates a scalar value for each augmented token
sequence t′i which should be greater or equal than the
scalar value for the original token sequence s(t′i) &
s(ti) because it contains α unknown tokens [M] and,
therefore, does not comply with established knowledge.
We gather all values - calculated by the model - for the
augmented token sequences to receive a distribution D.
D = (s(t′i) : t
′
i ∈ ltrain, 0 ≤ i ≤ |ltrain|). (6)
This distribution is the basis for the decision
boundary ε. We calculate the decision boundary by
choosing the i-th percentile p of the distribution D and
multiplying this value with a regulator variable β.
ε(D, p, β) = Dp · β (7)
This formula calculates the final decision boundary
from the given distribution for the deviated token
sequences. The parameter p is a bias regulator, because
there is a possibility, that the model calculates outliers
for few normal augmented log messages. These outliers
can occur when rare normal log messages resemble the
stabilization class data and have high anomaly scores.
With β, we can control whether we want to allow more
deviations for normal data during the prediction phase.
5. Evaluation
To quantify the performance of A2Log, we test it
on three real-world HPC log datasets and one industry
dataset. Thereby, we compare our anomaly detection
method with three other approaches and evaluate the
performance of our anomaly decision boundary.
5.1. Experimental Setup
For the evaluation, we investigate four different
training splits where we use the first 10%, 20%, 40%,
60% of normal data to train the anomaly scoring model
and calculate the anomaly decision boundary. The
remaining log messages are used for the testing. For
each split, we examine the F1 score, precision, and
recall. This setup is applied to the three publicly
available datasets as well as to the industry dataset.
Publicly Available Datasets. We select three real-world
datasets from HPC systems for evaluation as target
systems, namely Blue Gene/L (BGL), Spirit, and
Thunderbird (Tbird) [38]. From every dataset2, we
utilize the first 5 million log messages.
To reveal the characteristics of the datasets, we
have calculated the log templates for each dataset using
Drain [39]. Table 1 depicts the count of normal and
abnormal data, the count of log templates for the whole
dataset, and the number of distinctive log templates that
are present in the test dataset only, without being in the
training dataset. It can be seen that especially for small
amounts of training data, there are a lot of log messages
in the test data, that are not seen in the training data,
especially on the BGL dataset. That makes anomaly
prediction difficult when only the normal data is trained,
and the normal data in the test set deviates from it.
Overall, 7 % to 15 % of the log lines are abnormal.
Industry Dataset. Furthermore, we investigate
A2Log for an industry dataset that comes from the
production environment of an IT service and cloud
provider. Thereby the focus is to ensure a dependable
storage service, by detecting anomalies in the log data
from the underlying hardware. For this, we used log
data from different disk controllers that are managing a
variety of hard disks. The task is to identify anomalies
by only training normal log data from some hard disks
with no recorded anomalies and apply the model to new
disks without manual optimization.
Table 2 shows the total number of training samples
and the number of unique training samples, depending
on the split. It also reveals the numbers of total and
unique normal samples in the test data. Furthermore, it
reveals the count of abnormal samples and the number of
unique anomalies in the test dataset. It can be concluded
that there are only very few different anomalies in the
test dataset but they occur frequently. Furthermore, the
rate of anomalies for the dataset is between 3 to 3.5 %,
regarding the respective split. The dataset has 7,120,988
log lines in total.
Benchmark Approaches. In total, we evaluate
four different methods, including A2Log. The first
baseline is DeepLog, where we set the final decision
boundary as best as possible. For the other three
2https://www.usenix.org/cfdr-data
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#unique log templates in test
System #normal #anomalies #templates that do not appear in train for splits
10 % 20 % 40 % 60 %
BGL 4,399,503 348,460 1,571 1,318 1,232 1,158 1,077
Thunderbird 4,773,713 226,287 1,302 232 205 128 61
Spirit 4,235,110 764,890 1,457 1,091 1,028 297 129












0.1 711,841 226,375 6,409,147 1,270,089 28 196,534
0.2 1,424,198 465,666 5,696,790 106,0947 27 196,519
0.4 2,848,395 536,947 4,272,593 987,417 23 146,099
0.6 4,272,593 895,520 2,848,395 614,089 18 100,827
Table 2. Dataset description of the industry dataset.
methods, we train our described transformer model for
the anomaly scoring and then calculate the decision
boundary differently. First, we calculate the decision
boundary based on the 3-sigma method. The 3-sigma
decision boundary is calculated on the anomaly scores
of the trained model for all training data, excluding
the stabilization class. The second benchmark Best
is the best possible result for the transformer model,
which is achieved through utilizing the test data,
including the abnormal samples, to calculate the optimal
decision boundary. Therefore, this benchmark cannot be
exceeded and is considered as an absolute upper limit.
Therefore, the goal is to get as close as possible to
this result. We then evaluate A2Log against these three
benchmarks.
5.2. Implementation Details
First, we tokenize the content of each log line as
described in section 4 and then truncate all sequences
of tokens to the same length |ti| = 20. We set the
dimensionality d of the embeddings to 128. The weights
of the embeddings are initialized with Xavier [40]. For
the anomaly scoring model training, we use a hidden
size of 256, a batch size of 1024, a dropout rate of
5 · 10−2. For the optimization task, we use the Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 10−4 and a weight
decay of 5 · 10−5 in every experiment.
Since we need a stabilization class S to train
our model, we use 60k random messages from other
datasets. The corresponding mappings are displayed in
Table 3.
For the three datasets (BGL, Thunderbird, and
Spirit), we utilize 120,000 log lines each as a
Dataset #logs for stabilization from
for evaluation BGL Tbird Spirit #total
BGL / 60000 60000 120000
Tbird 60000 / 60000 120000
Spirit 60000 60000 / 120000
Industry dataset 60000 60000 60000 180000
Table 3. Log messages utilized for the stabilization
class.
stabilization class. For the industry dataset, we utilize a
total of 180,000 log lines as the stabilization class. Due
to the disparity in the number of training samples of the
normal log messages and the stabilization class, we use a
weighted sampler for the training to balance the training.
All models are trained until an average loss of 0.01 per
sample, or a maximum of 50 epochs, is reached.
The anomaly decision function a is parameterized as
shown in Table 4.
Parameter BGL Thunderbird Spirit industry
dataset
α 1 1 1 1
p 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
β 2.5 2.5 5.0 2.0
Table 4. Decision boundary parameters to calculate
ε.
We set α to 1 in each experiment for each dataset
to replace only one token of the log message with the
unknown token for the data augmentation. Likewise,
in each experiment, we set p to 0.95 to filter out 5 %





















































































































































































































































































































Figure 6. Evaluation on BGL, thunderbird and spirit.



































































































3-Sigma A2Log Best DeepLog
Figure 7. Evaluation on the industry dataset.
Furthermore, we adjust β for each dataset but keep it the
same for each experiment on the respective dataset.
5.3. Results
For all evaluations, we do every experiment three
times and depict the best results in terms of the F1-score
in Figure 6 for the three publicly available datasets and
in Figure 7 for the industry dataset.
Figure 6 depicts the results of Best, 3-Sigma and
Deeplog, compared with A2Log. It shows the respective
approaches for different amounts of training data of
10%, 20%, 40%, 60% of the respective dataset. It can
be seen that A2Log is superior or equal to DeepLog and
the baseline 3-Sigma in all experiments. In addition,
A2Log achieves almost the same F1 scores as Best
in all experiments. A noticeable aspect of the Spirit
dataset is that as soon as only a few learning samples
are available, the decision boundary function of A2Log
no longer turns out to be that precise. Nevertheless,
the other training splits for the Spirit dataset show that
our unsupervised A2Log approach can perform equally
to an optimal decision boundary. The results on the
BGL dataset are not particularly high, as there is a
fundamental concept drift in the data, which can be seen
by the fact that even for high training splits of 60 % there
are still many log templates present in the test dataset
that are not present in the training dataset as shown in
Table 1.
In addition, the two parameters α and p can be
set to 1 and 0.95 independently of the dataset. This
shows that the method is robust in parameter choice and
independent of the dataset.
Figure 7 depicts the performance of A2Log for
different training splits. Thereby it compares A2Log
with the best possible decision boundary and the
3-sigma boundary. It can be observed that A2Log
outperforms 3-Sigma and is as good as the best possible
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decision boundary. When A2Log can train enough data,
it is able to identify anomalies on new hard disks with
perfect scores.
6. Conclusion
Anomaly detection methods have become
increasingly important to ensure the dependable
and stable operation of IT services, including their
serviceability. However, existing unsupervised anomaly
detection methods are applied under constrained
assumptions for the final anomaly decision. Therefore
we propose A2Log, to address the current limitations
of unsupervised anomaly detection methods. Unlike
other unsupervised approaches, it calculates its decision
boundary for the final decision by exploring the model
behavior based on augmented training data. With data
augmentation, we simulate deviations in log data that
occur from service updates over time. We evaluate our
approach on three publicly available datasets and one
industry dataset. Thereby, we show the effectiveness
of our approach when it is applied in an unsupervised
setting.
Even if we can simulate deviations of the normal
log lines with the help of our data augmentation and
thus classify new normal log lines as such, we see
as a limitation that a fundamental concept drift in the
data pushes the method to its limits and thus leads to
misclassifications. Nevertheless, A2Log can keep up
with the optimal decision boundary, which can only
be calculated by utilizing available anomaly examples.
Furthermore, we are able to show that the entire
method outperforms DeepLog and 3-Sigma as a baseline
decision boundary.
As further work, we consider additional adjustments
to the data augmentation process, to integrate it into
other anomaly detection methods. Thereby, we want to
apply data augmentation techniques that are well known
in the research area of natural language processing.
Furthermore, we want to extend A2Log to other
anomaly detection settings, e.g. supervised or weakly
supervised settings.
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